

# WHAT THE SOLDIER THINKS

A Monthly Digest of War Department Studies on the Attitudes of American Troops

Classification Canceled



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By D. D. B.

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# MENTAL RECONDITIONING AFTER BATTLE

The shock of combat creates problems of mental reorientation among the men which must be solved before they fight again

Source: Study of cross sections of enlisted men from three Pacific divisions which have fought the Japanese.

When a battle is over, machines and weapons must be reconditioned for the next battle to come. So must men. And the reconditioning of men -- physically and mentally -- is as much a responsibility of the Company Commander as is the reconditioning of the machines and weapons assigned to his command.

There are three major aspects involved in reconditioning men after battle:

1. Medical attention
2. Rest and relaxation
3. Mental reorientation

The first two aspects are jobs in which the Company Commander can call in the assistance of such agencies as Special Services, Morale Services, the Medical Department and the Red Cross. These are working out better and better as the war progresses.

The third aspect -- mental reorientation -- has not been working out too well despite the fact that it is as vital a part of the reconditioning program as are the other two. There is much the Company Commander can do to assist in this job, to dispatch his responsibility to his command. Before he can tackle the responsibility, however, he needs to know just what the mental problems arising after battle are.

## THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL ORIENTATION AFTER BATTLE

Research studies among combat veteran troops point out that one of the more serious post-battle problems affecting command rises out of men's desire for

information. Men want to know the "what" and "why" of their combat action. They want that information *before*, *during* and *after* battle. It gives them the conviction necessary to inspire their combat action and provides a firm basis of any future action they are called upon to make.

That most combat veterans are not getting enough information before and during battle can readily be seen from the following charts. (The previous issue of "What the Soldier Thinks" contains further proof of this fact. See "Keep Your Men Informed" pp. 6-7.)

Question: "While you were at the battle front, did your leaders explain enough of the combat mission of your squad to you so that you knew just what you personally had to do?"

Yes, they explained as much as they could

49%

No, they could have explained a little more

24%

No, they could have explained a great deal more

No answer

Asked if their leaders had explained enough about the whole battle so they could see how their company's part fitted into the campaign as a whole, the men replied:

Yes, they explained as much as they could

48%

No, they could have explained a little more

24%

No, they could have explained a great deal more

No answer

Though officers often do not themselves have sufficient information about their outfit's part in a given battle, they should make it their business to transmit all the information they do have to the men wherever possible. This information is also necessary *after* battle because of its effect in the mental reorientation of troops. This is especially important when one considers the following:


Though battle conditions are such that almost all men report having felt at one time or another that a particular battle was not worth the cost, the men who felt *least* informed about their combat missions are most likely to report almost always feeling that the battle wasn't worth the cost.

Thus the first cardinal rule in a post-battle mental reorientation program is: *Keep your men informed.*

#### KEEP THE RESPECT AND AFFECTION OF YOUR MEN

The second cardinal rule of post-battle mental reorientation may be stated as follows: *Keep the respect and affection of your men.*

One big goal of post-battle reconditioning is getting men ready for another campaign. Research studies show that the men who feel their officers take a personal interest in them are more likely to indicate mental readiness for further combat.



#### SOME FREE COMMENTS ABOUT OFFICERS

In the transition from the camaraderie of battle to the garrison disci-

pline of rear areas, officers can easily lose the respect and affection of their men. This invites serious morale consequences. In the course of the studies, many men made a point of complaining about the "shock" of adjusting from the camaraderie of battle to the strict discipline which follows battle. The following comments, biased though they may be, serve to illustrate how serious this post-battle problem can be:

"The officers are alright in combat but why do they have to treat us as complete strangers afterwards. After all, we all go through the hell together." (S/Sgt.)

"Up in the line superiors would treat you like a brother. Within 24 hours after you got off the lines, the bulletin board is full of do's and don'ts." (S/Sgt.)

Perhaps the one thing that rankles men most deeply in this regard is when they see their officers enjoying special privileges and luxuries after combat while they themselves are up against it.

"While we were sent back looking for a little rest and enjoyment, passes were few and short. The officers went out every night while we had to stay in or else drive them on their own dates and break ours." (Pvt.)

"Our officers are not interested in us at all, they are only interested in themselves. When we had our rest (so they called it) they used all the transportation, got all the liquor, stayed out all night, and we trained and prepared for inspection. These things can be straightened out only by someone inspecting them, unannounced." (S/Sgt.)

#### WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT

The change from battle freedom to rest area discipline is bound to bring a certain amount of shock with it. But it is the junior officers' responsibility to



lessen that shock by doing everything in his power to hold on to the respect and affection he had from his men during combat. The following recommendations should prove helpful to him in striving for that objective:

1. Explain to the men before they reach the rest area just why military necessity demands that they take certain training and stand inspection when they reach the area. Explain further that the fact that they will be required to show every military courtesy in the rest area has no effect on your own relationship with them; you're still "comrades in arms."

2. Never forget that your men are watching your actions all the time. Make certain that you've done everything possible to make the men comfortable before you seek out means of making yourself comfortable.

### THE PROBLEM OF ROTATION

Many men come out of a long and punishing campaign feeling they have done their share. They want to go home. They are dissatisfied with the rotation program. They complain bitterly about what they think is the unfair treatment they are getting.

Altogether, 29 percent of the men studied volunteered comments on the subject of rotation. These men made up fully half of those who took pains to comment at all.

Men's dissatisfaction with being kept overseas for long periods through the slow working of a limited rotation policy is aggravated by the following:

1. Letters and newspapers from home telling of soldiers in the States receiving furloughs.

2. Misconceptions about the amount of shipping available to take them home. Even non-combat troops overseas seem to feel that there is no reason why the Army couldn't bring them home if it really wanted to.

3. Distrust of promises because early promises were not always kept.

The following comments are typical of those made voluntarily by enlisted men generally:

"We have been through 2 campaigns and deserve a rest back home. I believe all the men would be willing to go overseas again after 6 months or more. This sounds like a sob story to go home. That's just what I want it to sound like. My morale is about 50 fathoms below sea level." (S/Sgt., Purple Heart)

"I don't care about going into combat any more. I think I've had my share being overseas over two years. That's plenty for any men. Let them USO boys get some of this chow once in a while, then they will no what it is and sleep in the mud and mosquitos buzz around them like P-38s. Then they will know what life is in this dam Pacific." (Pfc.)

"Us guys over here thats left of the outfit are beat up with malaria and tropical ulcers. We should have a chance to breath a little fresh air for a while. But I guess you better keep them USO boys back there or there wont be any USO. If we have to will take another crack at the Japs. There is nothing to look forward to anyway." (Pvt.)

### LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM HOME

"It's hard as hell to be here and read in every paper that comes from home where Pvt. Joe Dokes is home again on furlough after tough duty as a guard in Radio City." (Sgt.)

"...I've lost all hope of ever getting back home. My own parents are tearing down my morale because the radio and newspapers tell them that the men who have 2 years overseas are coming home...Why build up false hopes?" (Cpl.)

"Every paper we get from home usually shows several of the Canteen Commandos on furlough. With two major battles behind us we should get the same break." (Pvt.)

### ENVY OF THE MARINES

"If the Marines that were over here deserved to go back we sure do because we did the job while the Marines got all the glory and the trip

home." (S/Sgt, Silver Star and Purple Heart)

"We all feel that the U.S. is a foreign nation to us, we have been away so long. Do something about getting us home. After all the Marines that were with us on Guadalcanal are all at home now." (Pvt., Silver Star and Purple Heart)

### MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT TRANSPORTATION

"They say there is no transportation to the States, but what we would like to know is what the ships carry back that bring the men over." (Sgt.)

"Now that we have a Navy equal to the combined navies of the world and are turning out shipping at a fantastic rate, I can see no excuse for cutting the percentage of men to be returned to the U.S.... I've had it comparatively easy, still I'm sure that something has gone out of me that I'll never regain. Recurrent malaria, disillusionment, frustration, monotony, distrust in promises from high ups, slowing failing health -- all have combined to undermine my morale." (Sgt.)

### SKEPTICISM ABOUT PROMISES

"I was very interested in combat at first. We were promised when we did a job things would happen so we could see what we had been fighting for. That never happened. By all means give the old men overseas a chance to get home. I have been away 4 years." (S/Sgt.)

"My mother has been ill from worry and the Government gives her big hopes of me returning and then does nothing. All promises and no action. I would rather not have them say anything than to make a promise and not keep it. I think two years is long enough for any man to spend in the tropics." (Sgt., Silver Star)

### DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM

Any attempt to deal with the problems arising out of men's attitudes toward rotation and their desire to get home should be aimed directly at the specific complaints outlined above. In explaining the facts to the men, officers can base their statements on the following:


1. The fact that ships go back to the States relatively empty is not indication

that they should be used to take many men home. The overseas theaters are expanding constantly and no men can be relieved unless replacements are available. There simply isn't enough shipping to keep a steady flow of replacements coming.

2. The Army is not to blame for building up the false hopes of friends and relatives of overseas troops. Loose talk in newspapers and magazines is responsible.

### MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS

The experience of combat tends to leave many men nervous and jittery. Combat troops exhibit much more anxiety (concern about certain of their personal reactions which do not ordinarily bother normal troops) than do troops who have never seen combat. The following figures tell the story:



Dealing with the psychoneurosis problems of combat troops is the job of the medical officer, of course. But there is much that the company-grade officer can do by talking with his men and singling out the more serious cases to be referred to the Medical Department for treatment. No Company Commander should fail to make every effort to help his jittery and nervous troops get straightened out before sending them in to the next campaign.

### IN CONCLUSION

The four main problem areas discussed in this report indicate the importance and the seriousness of a program of mental reorientation of troops after combat.

The recommendations made here are only meant to be suggestive and the Company Commander will want to attack the problems in the way which best meets the practical considerations of his command.

# WHAT SOLDIERS THINK ABOUT ENEMY PROPAGANDA

Japanese and German radio propaganda is failing to impress most officers  
and men listening to it

**Source:** Studies of cross sections of company-grade officers and enlisted men in combat veteran divisions from ETO and the Pacific.

Enemy propaganda manufacturers peddling their wares over Radio Tokyo and Radio Berlin are missing the boat. Their propaganda seems to be bouncing off most of our combat GI's who almost invariably nail it for what it is: untruth.

Of the two propaganda agencies, Radio Tokyo is evidently failing more miserably than Radio Berlin in attempting to shake the resistance of our combat troops. The German brand of radio propaganda is managing to snare a much higher proportion of both officers and men who think that German propaganda is "mostly lies" but there may be "a little more truth than we care to admit" in what they say. (As in all surveys reported in "What the Soldier Thinks", the opinions of all officers and men

were obtained under conditions of absolute anonymity.)



As the charts below show, two-thirds of the enlisted men and four-fifths of the officers who listen to Radio Tokyo say that Jap propaganda over that network is "mostly lies."

German propaganda, which is seemingly more subtle and thus more palatable, is branded as "mostly lies" by 55 percent of the enlisted men and 56 percent of the officers who hear it.

Only an infinitesimal percentage of officers and men seem to be taken in by propaganda emanating from the two Axis capitals. All in all, there seems little reason for the officer in command of troops within reach of enemy radio broadcasts to worry about the effect of those broadcasts on his men. The GI is still a pretty tough customer to fool.

## ATTITUDES OF COMBAT OFFICERS AND EM TOWARD ENEMY RADIO PROPAGANDA

**Question:** "Have you listened to Radio Tokyo (Berlin)? How did you feel about the propaganda?"





# HOW TOUGH IS FIGHTING IN THE PACIFIC?

**Many veterans of European air combat think Pacific fighting easier,  
but Pacific veterans have different ideas**

**Source:** Groups of Air Force personnel returned from ETO and the Pacific.

The end of the war in Europe will be accompanied by an intensification of our effort against the Japanese. That effort will call for the effort of thousands of men now on duty against the Germans.

Out of this need to transfer fighting men from one front to another front half way across the world arises an orientation problem that demands solution. Men now fighting in Europe have definite opinions about the nature of fighting in the Pacific. They have formed pictures of the Japanese enemy. Any program designed to orient them to fighting against Japanese will have to take those pre-formed pictures into account.

How realistic are officers' and men's expectations about the conditions of living and of combat which will face them if and when they are thrown into

the Pacific fight? A study of Air Force officers and men with combat experience against the Germans (all of whom have been returned to the U.S. and reassigned) sheds a good deal of light on the subject. While these officers and men are thinking of a special type of warfare -- war in the air -- when they rate the toughness of Pacific fighting, their general attitudes are worth the consideration of all officers, ground and air.


## HOW ETO FLYERS RATE PACIFIC FIGHTING

Judging from the answers of these air men with experience over Europe, a large percentage of them expect the war in the Pacific to be relatively easy. (See chart below.) Ground crew men, on the other hand, are inclined to rate war in the Pacific as somewhat tougher than war in Europe.

### HOW ETO AND PACIFIC FLYERS FEEL ABOUT COMBAT IN THE PACIFIC

**Question:** "All things considered, how do you think Air Forces duty in Europe compares with Air Forces duty in the Pacific with respect to the difficulty of combat flying?"

Among Air Force Personnel with combat flying experience in . . .





### WHAT MEN WHO HAVE FOUGHT THE JAPS THINK OF PACIFIC COMBAT

In marked contrast to the feeling of veterans of European fighting are the opinions of men who have actually fought the Japs. (All of these men questioned had been returned to the U.S. and re-assigned.)

As the chart printed on the preceding page shows, flying men from the Pacific rate combat there as tough or tougher than combat in Europe.

On more specific questions related to the comparative difficulty of European and Pacific fighting, the air and ground crew men were asked to rate the toughness of flak and fighter opposition encountered in the two areas. Here again, the same general trend was evident. Men from Europe tended to doubt the toughness of the Pacific, while men from the Pacific were much more likely to rate the Jap flak and fighter opposition as at least as tough as German flak and fighter opposition.

### HOW AIR CORPS MEN RATE LIVING CONDITIONS

A marked difference is apparent between men's attitudes on combat diffi-

culty and *living* difficulty in the Pacific theater. On the latter question, even veterans of European combat are inclined to emphasize the extreme difficulty of living in the Pacific combat zones. Both Pacific and European air crew men agree by a large majority that the Pacific is much the worse place. (See chart below.) Most ground crew men in both theaters share this opinion.


In making this study it was impossible to get truly definitive opinions on combat and living condition in the two theaters because there were so few men available who had had combat experience in *both* the European and Pacific theaters.

Lack of such conclusive testimony should not limit the efforts of officers concerned with orienting the men in their commands to fighting in the Pacific. An orientation course might properly include comments on the fact that men who have fought in the Pacific rate the difficulties of combat in the Pacific as really *tough*. In the light of their opinions, there is no reason for European veterans to expect the Japs to be a "pushover."

### HOW ETO AND PACIFIC FLYERS FEEL ABOUT LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC

Question: "All things considered, how do you think Air Force duty in Europe compares with Air Force duty in the Pacific with respect to the general living and working conditions?"

Among flying personnel with experience in. . .



# GETTING THROUGH A RUGGED FLIGHT

Source: Study of opinions of officers and enlisted men in Bomber Crews returned to the U.S. after combat duty against the Germans or Japanese.

To our pilots, navigators, and other crew members flying missions over Europe and the Pacific islands, "rugged missions" are routine, part of the every day work load. To the flying personnel of the Air Corps still in training in the U.S., they are something to look forward to with mixed feelings of anticipation and concern.

When the flak and fighter opposition are heavy, men in the bomber crews often have to drain their last reserve of skill, training and guts to complete their missions and get back home. But experience makes skilled flyers more skillful. Flying officers and gunners who have completed tours of duty in combat have developed mental and physical habits that help them get through on rugged missions.

These combat veterans have much to offer in advice and tips to their brother flying officers and gunners back in the States. This report is concerned with that advice. It is based on the responses of bomber crew officers and gunners returned from overseas duty to the following question:

"If a friend of yours was just starting his tour of combat missions, what advice would you give him that would aid him on a rugged mission?"

Not all of the bomber crew veterans had advice to give in answer to the question. Many officers and men said simply that there wasn't much they could tell a friend facing his first rugged

## FIVE TIPS FOR GETTING THROUGH

1. Make the best possible preparation includes the following:
  - a. Caring for and checking up on
  - b. Keeping in good physical shape
  - c. Learning about what to expect
2. Keep as well protected as possible
3. Be prepared for any emergency
4. Keep in close touch with other officers and men in the crew
5. Think helpful thoughts that will
  - a. Thoughts of confidence in self
  - b. Thoughts of fatalism: "If you can do about it"
  - c. Thoughts of the enemy: "He's in place." "He's not half the worried"
  - d. Thoughts of religion and God
  - e. Miscellaneous thoughts: "It's what you think it will be"

mission that would help him. As one gunner put it:

"Nothing I could say would help him. The only thing that helps is what each person is made of. When the cards are down like that it is what the man is made of that brings him through or lets him down."

Others preferred not to offer advice on the grounds that all combat missions were different, proposed new problems, and they didn't want to commit themselves.

# MISSION

Veteran members of Bomber Crews recommend  
that new air crewmen keep busy, prepare for the  
worst, but not expect it

## A RUGGED FLIGHT MISSION

are entering plane. Such preparation

ment  
re going on mission  
every flak and fighter opposition  
e over the target

in the formation and with officers

fear. Such thoughts include:

crew  
ber's up, it's up and there's nothing  
eason you're in the mess in the first  
ou are and he's just as scared and

another job." "It's never as bad as

By and large, however, most officers and men had something to say on the subject. Their advice falls roughly into the categories outlined in the box above.

The categories are not listed in rank order. Some items were mentioned most frequently by pilots and navigators, others by gunners. The different nature of the jobs done by such personnel accounts in large measure for some of the advice they give. For this reason, the quotations in this report are identified with the flying jobs of the men making them.

## I. PREPARE FOR THE MISSION

Making the best possible preparation before taking off is a three-fold job which includes, briefing, checking of equipment and crew, and personal check-up. Many officers and men say that thorough pre-checks, however tiresome, give a man extra confidence once the plane is under way. Because he knows he and his equipment are ready, he faces the mission with confidence. Some typical comments:

*Caring for and checking up on equipment*

"Check your ship, guns & crew to see that they are thoroughly prepared for the mission."  
(Flight Leader)

"Check the bombs to make sure of fusing; check ship and know everything is O.K. Then your chances are 99 to 1 you'll come through O.K." (Pilot)

"Whenever possible take the best care of your guns they're your lease on life up there."  
(Gunner)

"Check your guns against freezing. Check all your equipment before starting. See that all life saving equipment is on board." (Gunner)

*Keeping in good physical shape*

"Be sure your physical condition is at the highest possible peak before the mission -- do nothing that might impair the dexterity of your reactions." (Navigator)

"Watch your diet before a raid." (Gunner)

*Learning about what to expect  
from the enemy*

"Learn the best evasive action against the type of flak you expect to encounter."

(1st Pilot)

"Pay attention to the briefing in regards to enemy and friendly fighters." (Gunner)

II. KEEP WELL PROTECTED

"Wear all possible protection, spiritual and physical. Remember, others may laugh at you for wearing a steel helmet, but what good can they do after your head gets holed through your fear of their derision." (Bombardier)

"Protect yourself to the best of your ability from flak with the equipment available such as flak suits, flak helmets, etc. Take every precaution placed at your disposal, after all, it is your life in the balance." (Gunner)

III. PREPARE FOR ANY EMERGENCY

"Always be prepared to walk, i.e. wear warm clothing, heavy shoes and keep your escape kit inside your clothing." (Pilot)

"Know the surrounding terrain so as to be able to hide from the enemy and if possible make your way back from the enemy lines."

(Flight Leader)

"Form habits as to where your equipment is placed so that if the need arises for it you will get your equipment as a sort of reflex..."

(Gunner)

"In evading from Germany he should carry plenty of matches and make sure he has a pair of shoes." (Gunner)

IV. KEEP IN TOUCH WITH CREW AND WITH OTHER PLANES IN FORMATION

"It takes only one mission when you are jumped heavily to make a believer out of you. STICK CLOSE TO THAT FORMATION."

(Assistant Flight Leader)

"Don't try to do it all alone, stay with the leader." (Pilot)

"Make your crew respect you in a pinch -- keep your voice calm at all times over the interphone. It will work wonders." (1st Pilot)

"Always work together with all officers and enlisted men on your crew to be a happy team. After a rough spot talk to all men in plane over the interphone telling them they were swell."

(Gunner)

V. THINK HELPFUL THOUGHTS

*Confidence in ship and crew*

"Believe what your superior officer tells you. He should know." (Flight Leader)

"Have faith in your plane and equipment. Check both as best you know how." (Gunner)

"Put a lot of faith in your other crew members." (Gunner)

"Have entire confidence in his entire crew, if not seek a transfer to one he does."

(Gunner)

*Fatalism*

"Just one bullet has your name on it."

(Operations Officer)

"Don't worry ever about getting knocked down... Always remember, 'Some days you win; some days you lose.'" (Pilot)

"I have always lived under the impression I had a certain day to die and could happen no other way, therefore I have been able to keep cooler under fire..." (Gunner)

*Thoughts of the enemy*

"Get sore. Think of all the things you could have done or be doing if the Germans and Japs hadn't started a war." (Pilot)

"Try to keep cool because the German or Jap may be more scared than you." (Gunner)



"Always remember you're a better man than the enemy with better equipment and fighting for a better cause." (Gunner)

"Say to yourself your better than he is. With that in mind you can take it. That's what I've always kept saying to myself." (Gunner)

"Just get a good grip to yourself and call the enemy all the vile names you can lay your tongue." (Gunner)

### *Religion and God*

"Trust God and right will be the victor, for there is no 2nd place in war." (Bombardier)

"Those little silent prayers always help." (Flight Leader)

### *Miscellaneous thoughts*

"Have but one thought: Others have done it so can I." (Pilot)

"Consider no difference between missions. They are all the same." (Operations Officer)


"Don't worry too much as no target is as rugged as storied have it before it is hit." (Pilot)

"Don't be disillusioned. It's hard. It's rough. But if your a man you can take it." (Gunner)

"Keep your head there is not near as much danger as is apparent. In my fifty one over half were not and 10 were very hot and I never received a scratch." (Gunner)

## MARKSMANSHIP AND COMBAT MORALE

Qualified marksmen are more likely to want combat than are men who failed to qualify or never fired



Source: Study of a cross section of enlisted men in an inactive theater overseas.

The chart opposite reveals how men's desire for combat duty is related to their marksmanship ability. This relationship between marksmanship and "combat morale" is also evident in the following finding: A larger percentage of men who are qualified marksmen feel that they are helping the war effort more as soldiers than they would be as war workers than among men who are not qualified marksmen.

It may be that men who desire combat tend to be better marksmen because they put more into their rifle training. On the other hand, there is reason to suppose that shooting ability influences men's combat desires and gives them an added source of pride in their soldier role. What is equally likely is that for some men, achievement in marksmanship is a cause of an attitude, while for others it is the result of an attitude.

# INFORMATION QUIZ

Here's a chance to see how your men's knowledge of the war and war personalities stacks up with that of typical enlisted infantrymen

The information quiz below includes 10 questions selected from a list of 17 which was administered to cross sections of Infantry troops in Continental U.S. How they scored can be judged from the results quoted below. Company officers can check their own men's level of information about the war by giving them the test and comparing their scores with those made by the sample groups. All but the last question can be answered simply by placing a check mark (✓) opposite the answers chosen. (Answers are on p. 15)

1. Mein Kampf was written by  
☐ Bismarck  
☐ Goebbels  
☐ Hitler  
☐ Hirohito
2. Which of the following countries is at war against the Axis?  
☐ Argentina  
☐ Sweden  
☐ Brazil  
☐ Turkey
3. The Japanese plan for conquering the Pacific was outlined by  
☐ The Tanaka Memorial  
☐ Ambassador Kurusu  
☐ Hirohito  
☐ The Diet in Tokyo
4. General De Gaulle is:  
☐ The Spanish dictator  
☐ Leader of the Fighting French  
☐ President of Argentina  
☐ An Italian general
5. General Tito is:  
☐ A Russian military Leader  
☐ Leader of the Greek guerrilla fighters  
☐ Leader of the Chinese communists  
☐ Leader of the Yugoslav Patriots
6. When the Japanese conquered the Dutch East Indies, they cut off a large part of our supply of:  
☐ Platinum  
☐ Tungsten  
☐ Rubber  
☐ Oil
7. The Junkers are:  
☐ The Nazi Storm Troopers  
☐ A German political party opposed to the Nazis  
☐ Wealthy Prussian landowners who control the German Army  
☐ Members of a secret society organized by the Nazis
8. How many "United Nations" are there at war with the Nazis?  
☐ Three  
☐ Four  
☐ Twelve  
☐ Over thirty
9. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met at:  
☐ Casablanca  
☐ Moscow  
☐ London  
☐ Teheran
10. How many of the "Four Freedoms" can you name? Write down the names.  
1. \_\_\_\_\_  
2. \_\_\_\_\_  
3. \_\_\_\_\_  
4. \_\_\_\_\_

## HOW THE INFANTRYMEN SCORED

The following figures show the percentage of infantrymen answering each question correctly: 1. 76%; 2. 57%; 3. 17%; 4. 86%; 5. 51%; 6. 88%; 7. 48%; 8. 50%; 9. 40%; 10. 34%; naming three or four of the "Four Freedoms" correctly.

# ATTITUDES OF MEN RETURNED FROM OVERSEAS

## The soldier coming back to the United States needs more information on a large variety of subjects

Source: Survey of several groups of ASF and AGF enlisted men returned to the U.S. from overseas. Some men were surveyed at Debarkation Centers, others at Reception Station, others at a Reassignment Center, and others at Army installations to which they were assigned for duty.

The average enlisted man returned to the States from overseas apparently carries with him an impressive amount of misinformation. Fortunately for morale, many of the surprises the returnee gets when he comes home are pleasant rather than unpleasant.

On the long road back, whether it leads through hospitals or through the regular channels of rotation, the typical soldier has a remarkable number of stories about what is in store for him when he gets home. He gets letters from earlier returnees. He gets well-meant but ill-informed advice from his buddies and even his officers. On the dock and on the transport the latrine communiques and the inside "dope" often serve to confuse him.

He may hear of the "pushing around" he will take in processing in the states at the hands of stay-at-homes who don't care about his welfare. He may hear of terrific "shakedown" inspections where the possession of battle souvenirs will lead to severe punishment.

He may even have heard that weird brainstorm of the "grapevine" -- the story that he will be considered so rough and brutal after his overseas experience that he will have to be sent to an Army school for manners before being allowed to associate with civilians.

On the other hand, some of his misinformation may lead to disappointments. Some men return expecting furloughs of a

month or two, rather than the 21 days that are standard. Here is what men at a debarkation center (first stop for men returning to the U.S.) said about their furlough expectations:

### KNOWLEDGE OF FURLOUGH TIME

Number of days	Percent of men at a debarkation center saying. . .	
	. . . EXPECTED WHEN OVERSEAS	. . . EXPECT NOW
Less than twenty-one	8	7
Twenty-one	42	63
Twenty-two to twenty-nine	2	4
Thirty	30	15
More than thirty	10	3
Don't know or no answer	8	8
	100	100

Men's misinformation leads, in many cases to a failure to appreciate Army concern for their welfare. For example, the processing of a returnee is arranged so that he is shipped to a reception center near his home, and is given a delay en route so that as much as possible of his transportation expense is born by the government. But when asked what reception center they are going to be sent to, and why the Army is sending them to that center, less than two-fifths know that it is to save them money on their ticket home. About a fifth say they are not sure, and the remainder feel that it is the most convenient thing for the Army to do or that there is some other reason.

## MISINFORMATION AT DEBARKATION CENTERS

Here, in the men's own words, are statements made at debarkation centers about what men consider to be misinformation they had been given:

"They told us we would be shook down for guns and diaries and that we would be taken to the stockade if any were found on us. We weren't shook down at all."

"I was told we would be doged around. But so far we have been treated the best we can expect them to do."

"That we'd be all put in the Infantry outfit ready to go overseas. And that the M.P.'s will be tough on us boys coming back from overseas."

"Was told we would go to Ettiquette School, but did not."

"They said we were to get a special combat uniform."

"I have been told that I would get a 45 day furlough. But now they tell me that I won't get but a 21 day furlough. Twenty-one days in five years isn't fair."

## MISINFORMATION AT RECEPTION CENTERS

Men at Reception Centers (where they go after Debarkation Center but before going home on furlough) indicate many of the same types of misinformation, plus some different types.

Frequently mentioned is the belief that they would receive complete new clothing outfits, special uniforms different from those of men in the States.

At the same time men express pleasure that their fears of mistreatment and shake downs were not realized.


## WHAT THE MEN WANT TO KNOW

The men were asked to check on lists the subjects on which they wish the Army had told them about. Here are the results (Percentages add to more than 100, since men could check more than one point):

## WHAT MEN WANTED TO KNOW ON THE BOATS

(Asked of men at Debarkation Centers)


Question: "Which of the following do you wish the Army had told you about on the boat?" (Check one or more)



## WHAT MEN WISH THEY HAD BEEN TOLD AT DEBARKATION CENTERS

(Asked of men at Reception Stations)

Question: "Which of the following do you wish the Army had told you about at the Debarkation Center." (Check as many as you wish)



## WHAT SORT OF ASSIGNMENTS DO MEN WANT?

The problem of reassignment is prominent in men's minds, even before they have their furloughs, as the charts above indicate.

Only a fifth of the Infantry returnees studied say they think they should be assigned to their present branch.



Seven-tenths of the men in ASF branches say they should be assigned to their present branch.

### WHAT THEY EXPECT

Excluding men returned as permanent limited assignment personnel, about half the men expect assignment either as cadremen or instructors at training centers or as permanent party men or station complements. About a third expect to be sent overseas as replacements or to be assigned to outfits that may go overseas.

### ATTITUDES TOWARD FURTHER OVERSEAS DUTY

Few recent returnees, naturally, state a willingness to go overseas right away. The man just back is much more likely to say either that he will be ready to go in a few months or that he doesn't want to go overseas again.

Among returnees who have been back in the States from two to eight months, a very different distribution is found.

Among combat veteran returnees back two or eight months, 14 percent more say they are ready to go overseas now than among recent returnees.

Among the non-combat veterans, returnees back in the states from two to eight months, 37 percent more say that they are ready to go overseas now than among recent returnees.

Many returnees feel they have already done their share in the war. This attitude is expressed by half the wounded returnees, by two-fifths of the non-wounded combat veterans, but by only one-fifth of the non-combat veterans.

### "ARE WE NEEDED?"

One of the most striking points discovered in this survey is the opinion held by a great majority of the men that there are enough enlisted men in this country so that returnees from overseas need not go overseas again. Only a handful disbelieve this, and only a minority are not sure about it.

Even among men who say they are ready now to go overseas again, three-fifths believe that the supply of men is great enough to eliminate the need for sending overseas veterans back across the sea. Only four percent of the men definitely disbelieve this idea and only a third are not sure.

Among the men who do not want to go overseas again, the percentage believing that they won't be needed is, of course, much greater. (84%).

### CONCLUSIONS

1. There is no evidence that the overseas man's return to the United States typically results in a let down, at least in the early stages.

2. There is good reason to believe that a better information program should be provided for returnees, and that this program should begin in the man's old outfit. Officers should inform themselves and their men on returning procedures, and should guard against conveying false information. Particularly, men should not be led to believe they will be home more quickly than is likely. The fact that they may be needed for further service overseas should be clearly explained.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS IN INFORMATION QUIZ

1. Hitler 2. Brazil 3. The Tanaka Memorial 4. Leader of the Fighting French 5. Leader of the Yugoslav Patriots 6. Rubber 7. Wealthy Prussian landowners who control the German Army 8. Over thirty 9. Teheran 10. Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Religion, Freedom from Want, Freedom from Fear.

## WHAT SOLDIERS THINK OF ATTITUDES SURVEYS

Source: Survey of a representative cross section of enlisted men in an overseas area.

Six out of every seven men in this area strongly favor the making of attitude surveys in their own area. Less than one man out of every hundred is consistently opposed to attitude surveys in the Army.

Reasons men give for their attitudes toward opinion surveys can be summarized as follows:

A third of the opinions are to the effect that such surveys are the best way to learn men's true opinions. For example:

"Because it gives the Army a good idea of what the average soldier thinks and doesn't get to say." (Pfc, Inf.)

A fifth of the reasons express the idea that surveys boost morale -- are democratic. For example:

"The soldier's morale is higher if he believes the Army is trying (or is) improving his condition." (Pvt. Inf.)

"If nothing else, it gives a man a chance to blow off a little steam whether you people pay attention or not." (T/Sgt. A.C.)

An eighth of the reasons are to the effect that it will help make a better Army, and the same number say the surveys will help the men -- may better things for them.

One reason in nine stresses bad conditions which should be made known.

Most of the reasons given by the few men who disapprove of surveys are of the "nothing will be done about it" type.

## YAKUTAT VERSUS QUONSET


Source: Survey of a representative cross section of enlisted men in one Far North Area.

Enlisted men in one Far North area tend to favor huts of the Yakutat, "Knockdown" or Stout House types over those of the Quonset or Pacific types by a fairly large margin. This is, in effect, preference for small housing units as opposed to large units.

The men were not asked to compare these types of housing with any other (such as barracks, tents, etc.), nor to rate the individual types within each of the two groups. The specific question was:

Among the men who had lived in both types, more than half favor the Yakutat, less than a third the Quonset. The men who have lived in only one type of hut tend to favor the type they know, but the men who have lived only in Yakutats favor their own type by a larger majority than do men who lived in Quonsets.

By far the most frequent type of reason given for preferring the Yakutat is social, i.e. "More Privacy", "Can live with just a few men who are your close friends, not so much friction," etc. The most frequent reason given for preferring the Quonset is that it provides more room. Next most frequent are social reasons, the exact reverse of those given for the Yakutat, i.e., "More fun with more men."



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Requests for back numbers of issues of "What the Soldier Thinks" should be submitted to the appropriate Adjutant General Depot or Port to which the requisitioning agency is charged for supply, in accordance with AR 310-200.

# HOW THE STUDIES ARE MADE

The articles in this bulletin are based on attitude surveys conducted by the Research Branch, Morale Services Division and the research units reporting to the commanding generals of the several theaters.

The staff of the Research Branch is composed of Army officers who are experienced in the field of surveys, together with a number of civilian specialists. Techniques have been developed, tested and adjusted to fit the Army's problems.

The basic steps in conducting a study are as follows:

1. The questionnaire is prepared in consultation with the War Department branches, or the theater command immediately concerned. Questions are carefully chosen to provide the exact type of information desired.
2. The questionnaire is pre-tested. That is, the questions are tried out on small groups of men to determine whether they are meaningful and understandable to the type of men or officers to be studied.
3. The project is cleared for action with the commands in which the study is to be made.
4. The number of men to be surveyed is set sufficiently large to insure statistically reliable findings.
5. The men to be surveyed are selected to insure as true a cross section of the group to be studied as possible. A cross section of enlisted men in the United States, for example, is so drawn as to give proper proportionate representation to each branch of the Army, to men in each stage of training, and to men stationed in the various sections of the country. It is, of course, possible to get cross sections of a single branch, of a division, of Negro troops, or any other portion of the Army desired.
6. The men complete questionnaires under conditions of absolute anonymity. They are assembled in small groups, and hear a short introduction given by a specially trained class leader. This introduction makes it clear to the men that only their frank opinion is wanted, and that they are not being tested or spied on. If the group is composed of enlisted men, the class leader is an enlisted man, and no officers are present during the session. No names or serial numbers are placed on the questionnaires. Ordinarily, illiterates or men of very low intelligence are interviewed by specially trained enlisted men.
7. The data are analyzed by specialists in attitude research analysis. Reports of these analysts are released to agencies concerned, and also form the basis for the material presented in this bulletin.

The procedure outlined above is that followed in the typical cross section survey. Other techniques, of course, are employed from time to time in special situations.